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pAbstract: This paper estimates the impact of fiscal consolidation on unemployment
and job market flows across EU countries using a recent database of consolidation
episodes built on the basis of a “narrative” approach (Devries et al., 2011). Results
show that the impact of fiscal consolidation on cyclical unemployment is temporary
and significant mostly for expenditure measures. As expected, the impact of fiscal
policy shocks on job separation rates is much stronger in low-EPL countries, while for
high-EPL countries there is a stronger reduction in the rate at which new jobs are
created. Since a reduced job-finding rate corresponds to a longer average duration
of unemployment spells, fiscal policy shocks also tend to have a stronger impact on
long-term unemployment if EPL for permanent contracts is stricter.
JEL codes: E62, J63, J65
Keywords: Fiscal consolidation; Unemployment; Job market flows; Employment
protection legislation; Labour market reforms1. Introduction
Since the outburst of the of the 2008 financial crisis, Europe is witnessing a worrying
upsurge in unemployment and an unprecedented degree of dispersion of unemploy-
ment rates. The implementation of major and protracted fiscal consolidation strategies
in such a context, and without prospects of a stable worldwide recovery, has stimulated
debate on the growth and employment impact of consolidation measures, with impli-
cations for the coordination of timing and modalities of budgetary adjustment across
EU countries (e.g., Corsetti, 2012).
Despite these concerns, a number of EU countries not only have recently put in
place ambitious fiscal consolidation plans, but have also at the same time carried out
major labour market reforms. In particular, the notoriously rigid and hard-to-reform
Employment Protection legislation (EPL) systems of Southern European countries have
been profoundly shaken with a view to stimulate job creation and tackle the problem
of labour market segmentation at a juncture where severe budgetary cuts to reassure
markets and put public finances on a sustainable footing where necessary.
Against this background, this paper aims at addressing a number of questions: to
what extent continued fiscal consolidation across Europe would impact on unemploy-
ment? Which type of consolidation, expenditure or revenue-based, would be most
employment-friendly? Does the impact of fiscal consolidation on unemployment come
mostly from the job destruction side or does job creation play a relevant role as well?
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ful when dismissals are less costly?
The analysis presented in this paper builds on various streams of existing literature.
The literature on large episodes of fiscal consolidation focuses on the possible expan-
sionary effects linked to the forward-looking behaviour of agents (e.g., Giavazzi and
Pagano, 1990; Alesina et al., 2002) and on the effectiveness of these episodes in durably
improving the state of public finances (e.g., Alesina and Ardagna, 1998). Another
stream of literature focuses on the estimation of fiscal multipliers. Most of the empir-
ical literature based on structural VARs identifies fiscal shocks from a-priori informa-
tion on the impact of the cycle on revenues and expenditures and generally find
significantly positive multipliers, but seldom larger than one (e.g., Blanchard and
Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2005).
Analyses based on a “narrative”, “action-based” approach to the identification of fiscal
shocks, which requires a bottom-up computation of discretionary fiscal measures
reported in official documents, also estimate significantly positive multipliers, but values
are often large, well above unity (e.g., Romer and Romer, 2010; Guajardo et al., 2011).
Most empirical analyses on the impact of fiscal policy focus on output, and only few
papers look at the unemployment and labour market impact. Monacelli et al. (2010) de-
velop a structural VAR for the US and estimate a negative and significant impact of
government spending on unemployment and job creation, while job destruction falls.
Brückner and Pappa (2012) estimate structural VARs for a number of OECD countries
and show that government spending can actually raise employment and unemployment
at the same time, due to the fact that it also increases participation.
The aim of this paper is to fill gaps in the existing literature in two main respects.
First, it presents estimates of the impact of fiscal policy on unemployment and job mar-
ket flows on EU countries: evidence is scarce for these countries. Second, it aims at
shedding light on the interaction between fiscal consolidation and labour market regu-
lation in driving labour market developments.
The baseline measure of fiscal consolidation used in the analysis is the action-based
fiscal consolidation variable constructed in Devries et al. (2011), which present the
double advantage of not including cyclical elements and being largely exogenous. As a
countercheck, a “top-down” fiscal consolidation variable based on the cyclical adjust-
ment of budgetary data is also used. The impact of fiscal consolidation is assessed on
cyclical unemployment, on job separation and finding rates (hazard rates), and on the
share of long-term unemployment. In light of limited sample size, econometric analysis
spans the whole available panel of data for EU countries, but separate analysis is carried
out for countries with a high vs. low degree of employment regulation.
Results confirm the finding that fiscal consolidation, notably government expenditure
cuts have a significant although temporary impact on unemployment, which comes
both from an increase in job destruction and a reduction in job creation. Interestingly,
this unemployment impact does not differ much between high or low-EPL countries.
There are considerable differences instead for what concerns job market flows, with fis-
cal consolidation in high-EPL countries having a much less strong impact on job de-
struction but also leading to a more pronounced reduction in job finding rates and,
therefore, to a higher share of long-term unemployment. Such results apply to EPL for
regular contracts, while countries with low EPL for temporary contracts simply exhibit
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ration flows, with no significant difference for what concerns job finding rates and
long-term unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section the data and
the empirical strategy are illustrated. Section 3 presents results. The last section con-
cludes with remarks on policy implications and suggestions for further analysis.2. Data and empirical strategy
2.1. Data
The analysis focuses on EU countries and spans the 1980–2010 periods, although lack
of data availability for some countries and variables restricts the sample.
The baseline measure of fiscal consolidation is the “action-based” variable constructed
in Devries et al. (2011). Data are collected over the period 1978–2009 for 17 OECD coun-
tries, 13 of which are EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK). This action-
based consolidation variable contains bottom-up estimates of the amount of measures
taken by the government during years where the overall objective of fiscal policy, as
reported in official statements and documents, was that of reducing the deficit and im-
proving the state of public finances. If in a given year, in a given country, fiscal policy
resulted in a reduction of the budget deficit pursued with the aim of improving public fi-
nances, the variable reports the estimated amount of discretionary measures, separately
for revenues and expenditures. In all other cases, the variable is set to zero, i.e., there is no
consolidation, either because the fiscal stance was expansionary or because fiscal contrac-
tion was mainly aimed at keeping under control domestic demand or at other purposes
different than budgetary correction.
These “action-based” measures have a double advantage. First, they are not affected by
the economic cycle, the reason being that their construction follows a bottom-up ap-
proach, i.e., the amount of measures is computed by summing up estimates contained in
official documents, so that cyclical movements in the budget are kept out from the start.
Second, these consolidation measures are unlikely to imply risks of reverse causation be-
cause only the fiscal adjustment episodes ex-ante driven by the objective to adjust the
budget is considered.
The analysis is complemented with the use of “top-down” fiscal consolidation mea-
sures. To this purpose, data on the change in the primary structural balance, structural
revenues, primary structural expenditures from the DG ECFIN AMECO database are
used, which are available for all EU countries (starting from 1995 only for countries
having acceded the EU in 2004 or afterwards). Budgetary data are purged from the im-
pact of the cycle and, for years after 2002, from one-off measures. To address the issue
of reverse causation, these top-down fiscal policy measures are instrumented using the
variables normally used in the estimation of fiscal policy determinants by means of
”fiscal reaction functions” (e.g., Bohn, 1998; Gali and Perotti, 2003).
As for unemployment, the baseline variable used is the cyclical unemployment, as
obtained from the difference between the overall unemployment rate and the NAWRU
(source: AMECO database). The data are available for all EU27, but only starting from
1995 for countries that acceded the EU in 2004 or after. By dealing with cyclical
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linked to panel co integration analysis are avoided. The underlying assumption is that,
any impact of consolidation on unemployment is mostly arising from variations in cyc-
lical unemployment.
Regarding data on job separation and job finding rates (hazard rates), the have been
constructed as described in Arpaia and Curci (2010), following the methodology pro-
posed by Shimer (2007). Data on job flows are available for all EU27 countries but for
shorter time series compared with cyclical unemployment (going back to 1997 at the
earliest). Data on the share of long-term unemployment on overall unemployment
are taken from Euro stat and are available for all EU27 countries starting from 1992 at
the earliest.
Figure 1 displays prima-facie evidence of the link between cyclical unemployment
and fiscal consolidation. Figure 1a reports for each country the action-based fiscal vari-
able and cyclical unemployment figures. It appears that cyclical unemployment was
quite often relatively high during the periods where fiscal consolidations took place.
Figure 1b confirms this finding in a scatter plot that exhibits a positive, although weak
relation between consolidation and cyclical unemployment across the panel. Of course,
this prima-facie evidence does not imply causation but is suggestive of a possible link
running from fiscal policy to unemployment outcomes.
2.2. Empirical strategy
The baseline regression framework used in the analysis of cyclical unemployment is
as follows:
ui;t ¼ αui;t−1 þ βui;t−2 þ γFCi;t þ θi þ ηt þ εi;t ð1Þ
where i, t denote country and year respectively, ui,t is cyclical unemployment, FCi,t is a
consolidation variable, θt and ηt are, respectively, country and year fixed effects, while
εi,t is a standard white-noise error.
The specification amounts to an augmented AR2 model, which is motivated in light
of broadly regular oscillations of cyclical unemployment around the mean (zero) over
large samples.
In (1), the use of the simultaneous fiscal policy variable is justified in the case of
action-based variables due to low risk of endogeneity and associated reverse causation
problems.
The top-down fiscal policy variables are instead instrumented to address the endogeneity
problem linked to the reaction of fiscal authorities to unemployment. The estimation in
this case takes place in two stages. In the first stage, the following equation is estimated:
df i;t¼αui;t−1þβui;t−2þγf i;t−1þδDit−1þφOGit−1þθiþηtþεi;t ð2Þ
where dfi,t is the fiscal impulse variable (the time change in the structural primary balance
as, structural revenue, or structural primary expenditure, all as a share of GDP), and
among the explanatory variables, in addition to the lags of the unemployment variable, ap-
pear variables used in the estimation of standard fiscal reaction functions: the own lag of
the fiscal dependent variable in levels, fi,t–1, the lagged government / GDP ratio, Dit–1, the
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Figure 1 Cyclical unemployment and fiscal consolidations (action-based), 13 EU
countries, 1995–2009. (a) Evolution over time. (b) Scatterplot.
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(FCi,t) in the second-stage regression, where unemployment is the dependent variable.
With a view to obtain fiscal policy variables constructed in a way similar to the action-
based fiscal variables (which are set equal to zero in non-consolidation episodes), the
values for FCi,t that do not correspond to consolidation periods are re-set to zero. A
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the instrumented primary structural balance is less than 0.5% of GDP, the top-down fis-
cal policy variable FCi,t is re-set to zero.
1
The modelling of the impact of fiscal policy on other labour market variables is analogous
to (1) except that, for the case of job market flows (hazard rates) and share of long-term un-
employment, the second autoregressive term is dropped (being largely insignificant).
Equation (1) is estimated by means of panel fixed effect estimation (least square dummy
variables) with robust standard errors for the case of action-based consolidation measures.
For top-down measures, the estimation is performed in two stages, as explained above.
With a view to shed light on the interaction between fiscal policy and labour market
regulation, regressions are run separately for high and low EPL countries. The break-
down of countries is performed in the most straightforward way: countries with high
(low) EPL are assumed to be those with an average value over the sample period of the
OECD EPL indicator above (below) the median of such averages across the whole panel
of EU27 countries. In the baseline analysis the EPL indicator used is that for permanent
contracts, and a check is made also for what concerns EPL for temporary contracts.3. Results
3.1. Fiscal consolidation and unemployment
Table 1 reports results concerning the estimated impact of fiscal policy (action-based) on
cyclical unemployment. The unemployment impact multiplier of the overall budgetary con-
solidation variable is positive, amounting to less than 1/10 of a percentage point of un-
employment for each GDP point of consolidation. While the impact of government revenue
is non-significant, that of government expenditure is negative, higher in absolute value and
of a higher order of significance that that for the overall budget balance. The estimated un-
employment impact multipliers are broadly in line with existing estimates of GDP fiscal
multipliers (for instance, the estimated 0.16 coefficient for government expenditure would
imply a GDP fiscal multiplier of about 0.5 assuming a standard Okun coefficient of 0.3).
Due to the auto-regressive process of unemployment, the peak multiplier is above the
impact multiplier, as the adjustment of unemployment to the fiscal shock takes time.
As shown in Figure 2, the peak effect materializes after one year (reaching almost 0.1
per cent for the overall budget and about −0.18 for expenditure cuts) and decays to
zero after about 5 years. Afterwards, cyclical unemployment tends gradually to revert
to pre-shock levels due to its stationarity properties.
The baseline specification in (1) using the budget balance as explanatory variable appears
relatively robust. In particular, dropping the second lag of the unemployment variable (col-
umn 4) leads to a considerable change in the regression coefficient for the first lag of cyc-
lical unemployment but the coefficient for the fiscal policy variable is not substantially
affected. Robustness analysis corroborates the choice of the simultaneous rather than the
lagged fiscal policy variable. Replacing the non-lagged fiscal policy variable with its own
lagged value leads to a non-significant coefficient (column 5). If one lag for the fiscal policy
variable is added to the baseline equation (column 6), it turns out being insignificant.
The unemployment impact of fiscal consolidation is similar if measured according to
top-down variables, despite the fact that the sample used in this case comprises a larger
number of countries (Table 1, columns 7, 8, 9).
Table 1 Impact of consolidation on cyclical unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Action-based fiscal policy variables, 13 countries EU, 1980-2009 “Top-down” fiscal policy variables, EU27, 1980-2010
Dependent variable: cyclical
unemployment








Explanatory variables action-based action-based action-based action-based action-based action-based
Cyclical unemployment (1 lag) 1.206** 1.220** 1.194** 0.731** 1.217** 1.206** 1.098** 1.094** 1.063**
[27.46] [29.89] [27.45] [29.23] [30.05] [0.0441] [19.30] [19.74] [15.58]
Cyclical unemployment (2 lags) −0.609** −0.611** −0.607** −0.614** −0.610** −0.491** −0.485** −0.458**
[−17.67] [−16.80] [−18.92] [−16.61] [0.0356] [−10.63] [−10.52] [−8.217]
Fiscal policy variable 0.0796+ 0.0184 −0.160* 0.103 0.0751 0.142 −0.0368 −0.138*
[2.009] [0.285] [−2.609] [1.595] [0.0465] [1.423] [−1.073] [−2.738]
Fiscal policy variable (1 lag) 0.0410 0.0132
[1.072] [0.0466]
Constant 0.307 −0.236* 0.303 0.0972 0.340+ 0.308 −0.355** −0.289** 0.221
[1.682] [−2.910] [1.694] [0.455] [1.801] [0.182] [−3.294] [−2.984] [0.983]
Observations 353 353 353 366 353 353 546 547 548
R-squared 0.864 0.862 0.865 0.779 0.862 0.864 0.748 0.746 0.740
Number of countries 13 13 13 13 13 13 27 27 27
+, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 per cent level respectively. T tests are reported in square brackets.
Specification. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Estimation method. Action-based fiscal policy: fixed effect panel OLS. Top-down fiscal policy measures: fixed effect panel instrumental variables (the
fiscal policy variable is instrumented with its own lag, the lagged output gap, and the lagged government debt/GDP ratio). Standard errors are robust with respect to hetereoschedasticity and non-independence
within country clusters.
Legend. Budget balance, action-based.(source: Devries et al., 2011): year-on-year change in government budget balance associated with fiscal consolidation measures; Revenue, action-based.: year-on-year change in
government revenues associated with fiscal consolidation measures on the revenue side; Expenditure, action-based.: year-on-year change in government expenditure associated with fiscal consolidation measures on
the expenditure side.
Top-down fiscal policy (source: ECFIN AMECO database). Change in structural balance = year-on-year change in cyclically-adjusted government budget balance, information on one-off measures netted out when
available; Change in structural revenue = year-on-year change in cyclically-adjusted government revenues, information on one-off measures netted out when available; Change in structural expenditure = year-on-year
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Figure 2 Fiscal consolidation impact on cyclical unemployment. Change in the unemployment rate
associated with a 1% of GDP fiscal stimulus.
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employment rate rather than on cyclical unemployment (Table 2), with the exception
of revenues, whose coefficient is in this case positive, albeit non-significant. This result
reassures for what concerns the use of cyclical unemployment as baseline variable, and
indicates that most of the effect of fiscal policy on unemployment falls on the cyclical
component of unemployment, with relatively minor implications for the NAWRU.2Table 2 Impact of consolidation on unemployment, action-based fiscal policy variables
13 countries EU, 1980-2009
(1) (3) (3)
Dependent variable: unemployment rate Budget balance Revenue Expenditure
Explanatory variables action-based action-based action-based
Unemployment (1 lag) 1.459** 1.481** 1.457**
[22.84] [21.55] [21.83]
Unemployment (2 lags) −0.589** −0.603** −0.589**
[−10.53] [−9.981] [−10.65]
Fiscal policy variable 0.129+ 0.145 −0.179*
[2.132] [1.138] [−2.920]
Constant 0.970** 0.928** 0.987**
[4.624] [4.415] [4.509]
Observations 353 353 353
R-squared 0.928 0.927 0.928
Number of countries 13 13 13
+, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 per cent level respectively. T tests are reported in square brackets.
Specification. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Estimation method. fixed effect panel OLS, standard errors robust with respect to hetereoschedasticity and non-
independence within country clusters.
Legend: for a description of the fiscal variables see notes to Table 1.
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with expectations, fiscal consolidation has a positive and significant impact on separ-
ation rates (Table 3). Results are also broadly in line with expectation for what concerns
job finding rates (Table 4). In this case, regression coefficients do not reach significance
levels but the signs of the coefficients of all variables indicate a negative impact of con-
solidation on job finding rates, irrespective how consolidation is measured. Moreover,
t statistics for the budget balance variable take values between 1 and 1.5 irrespective
of how it is measured,, not far from cut off values for statistical significance at 10
per cent level.
Results concerning the impact of fiscal consolidation on the share of long-term un-
employment do not lend themselves to an obvious interpretation. The impact appears
to be largely insignificant if action-based fiscal consolidation variables are used, nega-
tive but still insignificant if the top-down change in the structural primary balance is
used (Table 5). A-priori, there is no clear expectation on the impact effect of fiscal con-
solidation on the share of long-term unemployment. It has been shown that a positive
impact of fiscal expansion on participation rates may explain an increase in the un-
employment rate rather than a reduction (Brückner and Pappa, 2012). Job flows may
also play a role in driving ambiguous results of fiscal policy on unemployment. On the
one hand, since fiscal policy retrenchment implies more job dismissals, the increase of
unemployment inflows would lead to a reduction of the share of long-term unemploy-
ment. On the other hand, the reduction of job finding rates linked to fiscal consolida-
tion would play in the opposite sense: longer spells into unemployment for those
already jobless, and a consequent increase the long-term unemployment share. In light
of these opposite effects, it is not surprising that results are non-significant or ambigu-
ous in this case.Table 3 Impact of consolidations on job separation rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Budget balance Revenue Expenditure Change in structural balance
Action-based Action-based Action-based
Explanatory variables
Job separation rate (1 lag) 0.778** 0.783** 0.776** 0.767**
[9.692] [0.0782] [0.0806] [13.18]
Fiscal policy variable 0.0296* 0.0542* −0.0465 0.0463*
[2.518] [0.0239] [−0.0285] [2.504]
Constant 0.174 0.172 0.174 0.131
[1.221] [0.141] [0.142] [1.133]
Observations 115 115 115 225
R-squared 0.720 0.720 0.718 0.685
Number of countries 13 13 13 27
+, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 per cent level respectively. T tests are reported in square brackets.
Specification. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Estimation method. Action-based fiscal policy: fixed effect panel OLS. Top-down fiscal policy measures: fixed effect panel
instrumental variables (the fiscal policy variable is instrumented with its own lag, the lagged output gap, and the lagged
government debt/GDP ratio). Standard errors are robust with respect to hetereoschedasticity and non-independence
within country clusters.
Legend. Fiscal variables: see footnote to Table 1.
Table 4 Impact of consolidations on job finding rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)











Job finding rate (1 lag) 0.718** 0.718** 0.720** 0.666**
[9.340] [0.0779] [0.0751] [9.360]
Fiscal policy variable −0.305 −0.516 0.523 −0.259
[−1.389] [0.338] [0.357] [−1.116]
Constant 3.449** 3.445** 3.440** 3.265**
[4.136] [0.838] [0.824] [5.213]
Observations 115 115 115 229
R-squared 0.594 0.594 0.593 0.522
Number of countries 13 13 13 27
+, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 per cent level respectively. T tests are reported in square brackets.
Specification. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Estimation method. Action-based fiscal policy: fixed effect panel OLS. Top-down fiscal policy measures: fixed effect panel
instrumental variables (the fiscal policy variable is instrumented with its own lag, the lagged output gap, and the lagged
government debt/GDP ratio). Standard errors are robust with respect to hetereoschedasticity and non-independence
within country clusters.
Legend. Fiscal variables: see footnote to Table 1.
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The next step in the analysis is to estimate separately the impact of consolidation on
unemployment for high and low EPL countries, with a view to assess the interplay be-
tween the unemployment effects of fiscal policy and the role of labour market regula-
tions. Tables 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 report results. In addition to the indicator for the EPL
legislation for permanent contracts produced by the OECD, the indicator summarisingTable 5 Impact of consolidations on the share of long-term unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Action-based fiscal policy variables,





Budget balance Revenue Expenditure Change in structural
balance
Explanatory variables Action-based Action-based Action-based
Long-term unemployment share (1 lag) 0.798** 0.798** 0.798** 0.696**
[17.80] [18.43] [0.0451] [16.66]
Fiscal policy variable 0.0367 −0.000789 −0.107 −0.470
[0.0668] [−0.000893] [−0.868] [−0.927]
Constant 10.19** 10.25** 10.17** 15.95**
[4.715] [5.097] [2.157] [7.397]
Observations 206 206 206 371
R-squared 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.700
Number of countries 13 13 13 27
+, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 per cent level respectively. T tests are reported in square brackets.
Specification. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Estimation method. Action-based fiscal policy: fixed effect panel OLS. Top-down fiscal policy measures: fixed effect panel
instrumental variables (the fiscal policy variable is instrumented with its own lag, the lagged output gap, and the lagged
government debt/GDP ratio). Standard errors are robust with respect to hetereoschedasticity and non-independence
within country clusters.
Legend. Fiscal variables: see footnote to Table 1.
Table 6 Impact of consolidations on cyclical unemployment by EPL strictness,
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
cyclical unemployment
Budget balance Revenue Expenditure “Top-down” change in structural balance
Action-based Action-based Action-based
Explanatory variables 13 EU countries, 1980-2009 13 EU countries, 1980-2009 13 EU countries, 1980-2009 21 EU countries, 1980-2010
Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL
Cyclical unemployment (1 lag) 1.230** 1.222** 1.247** 1.228** 1.212** 1.217** 1.219** 1.191**
[27.28] [12.95] [29.48] [13.26] [25.51] [13.45] [19.49] [22.91]
Cyclical unemployment (2 lags) −0.625** −0.618** −0.630** −0.619** −0.624** −0.616** −0.599** −0.602**
[−16.92] [−8.179] [−14.33] [−7.887] [−19.25] [−8.326] [−13.30] [−10.46]
Fiscal policy variable 0.0947 0.0415 0.0567 −0.0103 −0.178+ −0.0891 0.0141 0.281
[1.828] [0.464] [0.775] [−0.0553] [−2.107] [−0.799] [0.250] [1.473]
Constant 0.598* −0.140 0.643* 0.330 0.584* −0.184 0.268 −0.173
[2.610] [−0.834] [2.672] [1.510] [2.651] [−0.336] [1.781] [−1.050]
Observations 196 157 196 157 196 157 260 216
R-squared 0.889 0.859 0.886 0.859 0.891 0.859 0.855 0.794
Number of countries 7 6 7 6 7 6 11 10
+, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 per cent level respectively. T tests are reported in square brackets.
Specification. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Estimation method. Action-based fiscal policy: fixed effect panel OLS. Top-down fiscal policy measures: fixed effect panel instrumental variables (the fiscal policy variable is instrumented with its own lag, the lagged
output gap, and the lagged government debt/GDP ratio). Standard errors are robust with respect to hetereoschedasticity and non-independence within country clusters.
Legend. Fiscal variables: see footnote to Table 1. The grouping of countries with respect to the OECD EPL indicator for permanent employment is built on the basis of the median country-specific average value of the















Table 7 Impact of consolidations on job separation rates, distinguishing by EPL strictness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
job separation rate
Budget balance Revenue Expenditure “Top-down” change in structural balance
Action-based Action-based Action-based
Explanatory variables 13 EU countries, 1997-2009 13 EU countries, 1997-2009 13 EU countries, 1997-2009 21 EU countries, 1997-2009
Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL
Separation rate (1 lag) 0.207 0.795** 0.233 0.794** 0.224 0.790** 0.608** 0.782**
[1.293] [14.15] [1.351] [15.35] [1.395] [11.74] [4.938] [17.48]
Fiscal policy variable 0.0662** −0.00522 0.122** −0.0315 −0.112** −0.0226 0.0618** −0.0369
[5.454] [−0.151] [6.081] [−0.573] [−4.972] [−0.370] [3.635] [−0.727]
Constant 0.588** 0.156* 0.701** 0.155* 0.703** 0.0114 0.207+ 0.0207
[4.401] [3.654] [4.737] [3.781] [5.040] [0.191] [2.009] [0.209]
Observations 66 49 66 49 66 49 104 81
R-squared 0.566 0.842 0.566 0.843 0.551 0.842 0.669 0.766
Number of countries 7 6 7 6 7 6 11 10
+, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 per cent level respectively. T tests are reported in square brackets.
Specification. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Estimation method. Action-based fiscal policy: fixed effect panel OLS. Top-down fiscal policy measures: fixed effect panel instrumental variables (the fiscal policy variable is instrumented with its own lag, the lagged
output gap, and the lagged government debt/GDP ratio). Standard errors are robust with respect to hetereoschedasticity and non-independence within country clusters.
Legend. Fiscal variables: see footnote to Table 1. The grouping of countries with respect to the OECD EPL indicator for permanent employment is built on the basis of the median country-specific average value of the















Table 8 Impact of consolidations on job finding rates, distinguishing by EPL strictness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
Job-finding rate
Budget balance Revenue Expenditure “Top-down” change in structural balance
Action-based Action-based Action-based
Explanatory variables 13 EU countries, 1997-2009 13 EU countries, 1997-2009 13 EU countries, 1997-2009 21 EU countries, 1997-2010
Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL
Finding rate (1 lag) 0.845** 0.678** 0.844** 0.672** 0.848** 0.685** 0.822** 0.610**
[3.872] [13.09] [3.894] [10.59] [3.881] [12.74] [4.587] [9.540]
Fiscal policy variable −0.0134 −1.192 −0.0852 −1.860 −0.0417 1.742 0.122 −1.772*
[−0.0668] [−1.589] [−0.254] [−1.909] [−0.104] [1.221] [0.876] [−2.285]
Constant −0.283 3.214** 2.764 2.948** 2.738 3.342* −0.0706 3.422
[−0.0898] [5.319] [1.262] [6.126] [1.243] [3.958] [−0.0338] [1.366]
Observations 66 49 66 49 66 49 104 83
R-squared 0.591 0.662 0.591 0.661 0.591 0.656 0.592 0.586
Number of countries 7 6 7 6 7 6 11 10
+, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 per cent level respectively. T tests are reported in square brackets.
Specification. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Estimation method. Action-based fiscal policy: fixed effect panel OLS. Top-down fiscal policy measures: fixed effect panel instrumental variables (the fiscal policy variable is instrumented with its own lag, the lagged
output gap, and the lagged government debt/GDP ratio). Standard errors are robust with respect to hetereoschedasticity and non-independence within country clusters.
Legend. Fiscal variables: see footnote to Table 1. The grouping of countries with respect to the OECD EPL indicator for permanent employment is built on the basis of the median country-specific average value of the















Table 9 Impact of consolidations on the share of long-term unemployment, distinguishing by EPL strictness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
long-term unemployment ratio
Budget balance Revenue Expenditure “Top-down” change in
structural balanceAction-based Action-based Action-based
Explanatory variables 13 EU countries, 1992-2009 13 EU countries, 1992-2009 13 EU countries, 1992-2009 21 EU countries, 1992-2010
Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL
Long-term unemployment share (1 lag) 0.832** 0.798** 0.839** 0.804** 0.831** 0.796** 0.791** 0.688**
[13.05] [13.71] [16.20] [12.77] [12.69] [13.45] [19.70] [10.42]
Fiscal policy variable −0.333 1.026 −0.425 1.683+ 0.617 −1.179 −0.893* 0.934
[−0.587] [1.161] [−0.483] [2.028] [0.682] [−0.708] [−2.377] [0.721]
Constant 3.134 11.08* 3.651* 10.95* 3.168 12.84** 10.71** 14.36**
[1.395] [3.765] [2.492] [3.765] [1.400] [4.239] [5.371] [3.987]
Observations 116 90 116 90 116 90 168 143
R-squared 0.901 0.843 0.901 0.842 0.901 0.841 0.831 0.689
Number of countries 7 6 7 6 7 6 11 10
+, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 per cent level respectively. T tests are reported in square brackets.
Specification. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Estimation method. Action-based fiscal policy: fixed effect panel OLS. Top-down fiscal policy measures: fixed effect panel instrumental variables (the fiscal policy variable is instrumented with its own lag, the lagged
output gap, and the lagged government debt/GDP ratio). Standard errors are robust with respect to hetereoschedasticity and non-independence within country clusters.
Legend. Fiscal variables: see footnote to Table 1. The grouping of countries with respect to the OECD overall EPL indicator for permanent employment is built on the basis of the median country-specific average value















Table 10 Impact of consolidations, distinguishing by EPL strictness for temporary employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variables Cyclical unemployment Job separation rates Job finding rates Share of long-term
unemploymentExplanatory variables
Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL
Dependent variable (1 lag) 1.116** 1.298** 0.667** 0.860** 0.784** 0.704** 0.687** 0.848**
[24.38] [15.71] [6.919] [17.26] [5.706] [14.80] [6.440] [14.65]
Dependent variable (2 lags) −0.573** −0.673**
[−11.86] [−8.563]
Budget balance Action-based 0.135* 0.110+ 0.0412* −0.0167 0.0209 −0.888 0.509 −0.497
[3.594] [2.395] [2.892] [−0.327] [0.0519] [−0.864] [0.769] [−1.017]
Constant 0.603* −0.223** 0.523** −0.231 4.969** 2.734 4.256 7.252+
[2.735] [−4.057] [7.633] [−0.727] [4.330] [1.042] [1.451] [2.255]
Observations 196 157 60 55 60 55 104 102
R-squared 0.885 0.885 0.699 0.785 0.641 0.631 0.887 0.850
Number of countries 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6
Action-based budget balance.
13 EU countries, 1992–2009.
+, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 per cent level respectively. T tests are reported in square brackets.
Specification. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Estimation method: fixed effect panel OLS, standard errors robust with respect to hetereoschedasticity and non-independence within country clusters.
Legend. Fiscal variables: see footnote to Table 1. The grouping of countries with respect to the OECD EPL indicator for temporary employment is built on the basis of the median country-specific average value of the
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/8only the legislation for the use and termination of temporary labour contracts is also
considered. Countries are split according the median of the country-specific average of
the EPL indicators over the sample.
Table 6 reports results for the impact on cyclical unemployment. When running the
analysis separately for high-EPL and low-EPL countries, it is found that fiscal consoli-
dations have a somehow larger effect in unregulated labour markets, even though, most
probably in light of the reduction in sample size, the estimated fiscal policy effect is not
anymore significant when the sample is split according to EPL. Using the top-down
change in the structural primary balance as a fiscal consolidation variable, it also ap-
pears that fiscal consolidation has no statistically significant impact on cyclical un-
employment, with a higher coefficient in high-EPL countries.
The result that fiscal consolidation has no very different effects in more and less reg-
ulated labour markets runs against the intuition. The explanation could lie in the differ-
ent behaviour of job creation and job destruction. It is well-known from existing theory
and evidence that strict EPL is associated with lower exit rates from unemployment but
also with a lower probability for the unemployed to find a new job (Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1994; Gomez-Salvador et al., 2004). It could be the case that in high-EPL
countries fiscal policy shocks destroy less jobs but also lead to a stronger reduction in
the rate at which new jobs are created, with a possibly overall strong effect on cyclical
unemployment.
The estimation of the impact of fiscal consolidation on job market flows separately
for high and low-EPL countries supports the above hypothesis. As shown in Table 7,
job separation rates rise significantly with fiscal retrenchments only in low-EPL countries.
Discretionary changes in the overall budget balance, government revenue, government ex-
penditure are all insignificant in high-EPL countries while they are largely significant and
with the expected sign in low-EPL countries. Conversely, job finding rates appear to react
negatively to fiscal consolidation mostly in high-EPL countries (Table 8).
The fact that job market flows react differently to fiscal consolidation according to the
EPL regime helps disentangling the impact of fiscal retrenchment on the share of long-
term unemployment. Since a reduced job finding rate corresponds to a longer average
duration of unemployment spells, one would expect that fiscal policy shocks also tend to
raise the share of long-term unemployment in high-EPL countries. The evidence reported
in Table 9 supports this expectation: fiscal consolidation is more likely to raise the long-
term unemployment ratio in countries with stricter EPL regimes.
Results in Tables 6, 7, 8, 9 make use of a sample split of countries according to the
OECD indicator for the EPL legislation for permanent contracts. It is well-known that,
across EU countries, significant differences are found concerning the way in which
temporary labour contracts are regulated, with some countries being characterised by a
"dual" EPL regime, with relatively flexible conditions for the use and termination of
temporary contracts coupled with heavy regulations on dismissals for permanent con-
tracts. With a view to check whether EPL for temporary contracts also matter for the
labour market impact of fiscal consolidation, Table 10 reports results splitting countries
according to the OECD EPL indicator for temporary employment.
The fiscal consolidation variable is the action-based fiscal measures affecting the
whole budget balance, and results are reported for cyclical unemployment, job market
flows, and the share of long-term unemployment. As compared with the sample split
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quite different. As the intuition would suggest, the stronger unemployment reaction in
low-EPL countries is associated with larger job separation flows. As for job finding
rates, they appear to be more strongly reduced during consolidations in countries with
higher EPL, but in this case the impact is not statistically significant. This may contribute
to explain why consolidation appears not to have a stronger impact on the long-term un-
employment ratio in high-EPL countries, as opposed to what found when splitting the
sample according to EPL for permanent contracts.4. Conclusions
Overall, the evidence confirms that fiscal consolidation has an impact on cyclical un-
employment in the order of 0.1% of additional unemployment for each point of GDP of
budgetary measures, stronger for expenditure measures, and which gradually fades away.
Results also show that while fiscal consolidation may not necessarily lead to higher
overall unemployment in countries with more regulated labour markets, there are rea-
sons to expect that in those countries the impact on unemployment composition could
be more worrying, being stricter EPL associated with a stronger reduction in job cre-
ation and a higher incidence of long-term unemployment. In this respect, the findings
bode well for the strategy recently followed by some EU countries and support the view
that in the current juncture tackling the challenges facing the euro area requires a
multi-pillar approach comprising both fiscal consolidation and courageous structural
reforms (Buti and Padoan, 2012). The findings also suggest that reform approaches
aimed at reducing "dual" EPL systems during consolidation would not necessarily be
harmful, as it appears that it is mostly EPL for regular employment that matters for the
impact of fiscal cuts on job finding rates.
The findings in this paper have also implications for the feasibility of structural re-
forms during austerity periods. Although it is well-known that certain labour market
reforms may be hard to square with fiscal consolidation because of their electoral (e.g.,
Buti et al., 2010) or budgetary costs (e.g., Deroose and Turrini, 2005), governments with
a strong mandate to bring public finances on a sustainable footing while taking cou-
rageous measures to improve to capacity of the economy to create jobs may be able to
carry out austerity measures and reform employment protection at the same time.
Further analysis on this topic seems deserved, not only to further check robustness of
results with respect to the measurement of fiscal policy, the specification of empirical
equations, and the definition of the sample, but also to better qualify results in terms of
which EPL policy settings matter most in driving results.Endnotes
1The 0.5 per cent cut-off value for the instrumented change in the structural balance
nets out minor consolidation episodes and permits to isolate a roughly equal number of
consolidation episodes as those identified with the action-based approach over the sample
period for the 13 EU countries for which data are available for both measures (120 action-
based consolidation period, 117 top-down consolidation periods). The action-based and
the top-down consolidation measures also exhibit a roughly similar average (respectively,
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/81.2 per cent of GDP and 0.8 per cent of GDP, respectively) and a fairly high (0.38), statisti-
cally significantly rank correlation.
2These conclusions are however to be taken with caution in light of the risk of incon-
sistent estimates in Table 3 arising from the likely non-statioarity of the unemployment
rate, revealed inter-alia by the high first-order auto-regressive coefficient.
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